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NOTES
Miscegenation Statutes and the Fourteenth
Amendment
U NDER the common law of England, difference in race was not a
disability rendering parties incapable of contracting marriage.' In
the United States, however, statutes prohibiting interracial mar-
riages were enacted from the first introduction of the Negro to the
American Colonies;' and at the present time twenty-nine states
have such laws.3 Despite many attacks on their constitutionality
since the adoption and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution, they had, until 1948, been consistently
upheld as valid.
In the recent case of Perez v. Sharp4, however, the Supreme
Court of California declared that a California statute prohibiting
the marriage of a white person with a Negro, Mulatto, Mongolian
or member of the Malay race was unconstitutional on the ground
that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is the purpose of this note (1) to present briefly
the attitude of the courts in the past toward statutes prohibiting
interracial marriages; (2) to examine the reasoning of the Cali-
forna Supreme Court in the Perez case; (3) to attempt to deter-
mine the power of a state to prohibit marriage on the basis of
race alone, in view of the restrictions imposed upon the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Phe Decisions in the Past
Following the Civil War there appeared much confusion con-
cerning the status of the Negro, especially with regard to discrimin-
atory statutes which still remained in effect in the southern states.
11 BL. CoMM. *433-37.
22 K rNT'S CoMM. *258, note (a).
3These statutes in the main prohibit and declare null and void marriages
between white persons and Negroes or Mulattoes. Some, however, extend the
prohibition to marriages between white persons and members of other races
including Hindus, Mongolians, Indians, Japanese, etc. The states which have
enacted miscegenation laws are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland.
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. See 1 VERNIER, AmERICAN
FAMILY LAWS 206-08 (1931).
432 Cal. 2d 711, (reported as Perez v. Lippold in) 198 P. 2d 17 (1948),
rehearing denied, October 28, 1948.5
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
19491
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Fourteenth Amendment had been but recently ratified, and
its effect, as well as that of the Civil Rights Bill,6 was not as yet
clear. Two early decisions in Texas declared that statutes prohibit-
ing marriage between white persons and Negroes were a part of
the institution of slavery and that the fall of that institution nulli-
fied these statutes.' This view was not adopted elsewhere, and was
subsequently abandoned even in Texas. The later decisions in
Texas denied that the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights
Bill, which made no allusion to such intermarriages, deprived the
states of the important power of regulating matters of such great
consequence and delicacy within their own borders. The courts
declared that the power of the states to control the marital status
is a governmental prerogative common to all sovereign states, a
power unaffected by the abolition of slavery.'
The Civil Rights Bill was also involved in another respect. This
Act conferred the right to contract on all citizens of the United
States, which now included the Negro. The misleading statement
in Blackstone's Commentaries9 that under the English law marriage
was considered in no other light than as a civil contract, was
seized upon for support by those who contended that statutes pro-
hibiting the contracting of marriage between white persons and
Negroes contravened the Federal Act. While this contention was
sustained in one case,'" it was later overruled; and the court in
the later case declared that marriage is more than a mere civil
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
614 STAT. 27 (1866). This Act was passed by Congress before the Fourteenth
Amendment had been ratified. Its provisions, however were incorporated by
reference in Section 18 of a later statute, 16 STAT. 140 (1870). It provided for
equal legal privileges and protections for persons of every race and color.
7
"The law in question was simply one of a system, brought into existence
by the institution of slavery and designed for its support, and which like all
other laws on the subject, disappeared along with that institution .... It
ceased to exist when the reason for it no longer existed." State v. Webb,
4 CENT. L.J. 588, 589 (Tex. 1877); Ex parte Brown, 5 CENT. L.J. 149 (Tex.
1877). It should be noted, however, that these decisions did not deny that the
states possessed the power to prohibit such marriages. In fact, they intimated
(dictum) that if the legislature passed such a law with the object of preventing
the amalgamation of the races, the law might be constitutional.
SEx parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699 No. 5047 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879), over-
ruling Ex parte Brown, 5 CENT. L.J. 149 (Tex. 1877); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex.
App. 263 (1877). For Notes concerning these cases, see 5 Cent. L.J. 2, and
Id at 174 (1877).
91 BL. COMM. *433.
10Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872).
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contract, that it is a civil institution of great public concern and
hence subject to regulation and control by the states. The court
further stated that the Civil Rights Bill plainly was not intended
to enforce social equality, but only civil and political equality; but
that if the meaning of its terms were doubtful, the policy of pro-
hibiting the intermarriage of the two races was so well established
and the wishes of both races so well known, there could be no
hesitation in declaring the policy paramount to any doubtful con-
trary construction.1
Attacks on miscegenation statutes were also based on certain
specific provisions of the Federal Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was contended that such statutes were unconstitu-
tional because (1) they impaired the obligation of contracts; (2)
they abridged the privileges of citizens of the United States; (3)
they deprived persons of liberty without due process of law; and
(4) they denied persons equal protection of the laws. The response
of the courts to each of these allegations will be considered
separately.
(1) They impaired the obligation of contracts. To this contention
the courts uniformly replied that marriage contracts were not the
type of contracts contemplated in Article 1, Section 10 of the
Federal Constitution. 2 They adopted the reasoning of Chief Justice
Marshall in the Dartmouth College case'3 in which he stated that
the only contracts intended were those respecting property or some
object of value, conferring rights which might be asserted in a
court of justice. They reiterated that marriage is more than a mere
civil contract, and declared that the states were free to regulate
the marital status as a matter of purely local concern.' 4
(2) They abridged the privileges of citizens of the United States.
In disposing of this argument, the courts declared that the rights
"Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877), overruling Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195(1872); Exparte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699, No. 5047 (C.C. W.D. Tex. 1879);
In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262, No. 6550 (C.G.N.D. Ga. 1871); State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (1871); State v. Hairston, 63 N.G. 451 (1869); Lonas v. State, 3
Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 287 (1871); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877).
12"No State shall... pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts."13Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 514
(1819).
14State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890); Exparte Kinney, 14 Fed.
Cas. 602, No. 7825 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262, No.
6550 (G.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 287 (1871).
The statutes prohibited interracial marriages and declared them null and void.
Assuming the validity of the statutes in all other respects, it would have been
possible to argue that since no valid contract arose in the first instance, there
could be no impairment of the obligation of a contract. This aspect was never
discussed in the cases.
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which a person has as a citizen of the United States were to be
distinguished from those which he has as a citizen of a state. They
viewed marriage not as a right inuring to citizens of the United
States, but rather as a right pertaining to citizens of a state. They
declared that over such a right the states have the usual powers
belonging to government-powers extending to all matters which
in the ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people, or the internal order, improvement and
prosperity of the state. State regulation of divorce and other
matters relating to the family was cited by the courts as examples
of the extensive control exerted by the states over the marital
status; and they declared that control of miscegenation is also
proper, and not prohibited by the constitutional provision protect-
ing the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.15
(3) They deprived persons of liberty without due process of law.
This argument was answered by one court with the statement that
due process of law meant the application of the law as it existed
in the fair and regular course of administrative procedure, thus
confining the concept of due process to questions of procedure.'"
In other cases, reference was made to the power of the states to
prohibit consanguineous marriages or bigamy, and it was reasoned
that if a state had power to control the marital status with respect
to those matters, it could also forbid interracial marriages.' Most
courts declared that the infringement of liberty involved was proper
under the police power of the states; that the state of the domicile
of the parties, being interested in the marriage status to be created,
had the right to determine, by legislative enactment, the com-
petency of the parties to enter into the marriage relation.'"
(4) They denied persons equal protection of the laws. To this
contention the courts replied that the prohibition against mixed
marriages was as applicable to white persons as to members of
'sCases cited note 14 supra; State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883); Frasher v.
State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877).
16Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877).
17Exparte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, No. 7825 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); Scott v.
Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Jackson 80 Mo. 175 (1883).
1SEx parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602, No. 7825 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); Ex
parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699, No. 5047 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879); In re Hobbs,
12 Fed. Cas. 262, No. 6550 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190
(1877); In re Walker's Estate, 5 Ariz. 70, 46 Pac. 67 (1896); State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (1871); In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P. 2d
217 (1942); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877); Eggers v. Olsen, 104 Okla.
297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924); Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. (50 Tenn.) 287 (1871);
Francois v. State, 9 Tex. App. 144 (1880); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263
(1877); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Grat. (71 Va.) 858 (1878).
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the other races named in the statutes, and that since the members
of all races received equal treatment, there was no denial of equal
protection. 9
The great majority of cases involving the constitutionality of
miscegenation laws have appeared in state courts. The few federal
courts which have considered the problem have merely cited state
court decisions, and, adopting their reasoning, have upheld mis-
cegenation statutes.2" It is worthy of note that no case, from either
set of tribunals, was ever taken to the United States Supreme
Court. The Decision in Perez v. Sharp
In the Perez case, a white woman and a Negro had applied
for a marriage license. The clerk refused the license, invoking
California Civil Code Section 60, which forbade the issuance of
licenses for the marriage of a white person with a Negro, Mulatto,
Mongolian or member of the Malay race; and Section 69, which
declared such marriages null and void. The applicants thereupon
petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus
to compel the issuance of the license. They contended that the
statutes in question were unconstitutional on the ground that they
prohibited the free exercise of their religion and denied to them
the right to participate fully in the sacraments of that religion.
They were members of the Roman Catholic Church and main-
tained that since the church had no rule forbidding marriages
between Negroes and Caucasians, they were entitled to receive
the Sacrament of Matrimony. It was held, three judges dissenting,
that the statutes were unconstitutional and that the peremptory
writ should issue.
The court declared that while the regulation of marriage was
a proper function of the state, laws which were discriminatory
and irrational unconstitutionally restricted not only religious liberty
but the liberty to marry as well. The court stated that marriage is
a fundamental right of free men, and that legislation infringing
such a right must be based upon more than prejudice and must
be free from oppressive discrimination to comply with the consti-
tutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the
laws. The court further stated that the constitutionality of state
action must be tested according to whether the rights of an indi-
19Cases cited note 18 supra; Stevens v. U.S., 146 F. 2d 120 (C.C.A. 10th
1944); State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed.
Cas. 262, No. 6550 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1871); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883);
State v. Hairston, 63 N.C. 451 (1869).
20See the Federal court decisions cited in notes 18 and 19 supra.
1949]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
vidual are restricted because of his race. Conceding that statutes
requiring segregation in law schools and on transportation facili-
ties had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, pro-
vided substantially equal facilities had been afforded to the
members of all races, the court declared that a holding that such
segregation does not impair the right of an individual to ride on
trains or to enjoy legal education is clearly inapplicable to the
right of an individual to marry. The court stated that in the pres-
ent case there was no redress for the serious restriction of the right
of Negroes, Mulattoes, Mongolians and Malayans to marry; that
certainly there was none in the corresponding restriction of the
right of Caucasians to marry. The court declared that a state law
prohibiting members of one race from marrying members of
another race is not designed to meet a clear and present peril
arising out of an emergency, and that in. the absence of an emer-
gency, the state clearly cannot base a law impairing fundamental
rights of individuals on general assumptions as to traits of racial
groups. The court concluded that the California statute, by re-
stricting the individual's right to marry on the basis of race alone,
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2
The three dissenting judges declared that the equal protection
clause was not violated since the miscegenation statutes did not
discriminate against persons of either the white or the Negro races.
They declared that each petitioner had the right and privilege of
marrying within his or her own group, and that there was no lack
of equal treatment. They stated that the underlying factors that
justified the prohibition of miscegenation closely paralleled those
which sustained the prohibitions against incestuous marriages and
bigamy. They cited the many decisions in the past which had
sustained miscegenation statutes, and declared that since some
authorities maintained that inferior progeny were produced by such
21Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, (reported as Perez v. Lippold in) 198 P. 2d
17 (1948). The court also declared that even assuming that such a classification
could validly be made under the equal protection clause in circumstances be-
sides those arising from an emergency, the question would remain whether the
statute's classification of racial groups was based on differences between racial
groups bearing a substantial relation to a legitimate legislative objective. The
court took judicial notice of the fact that there was no scientific proof that one
race was superior, mentally or physically, to another race, or that inferior off-
spring would result from interracial alliances, and declared that the statute was
an unreasonable restriction of the right to marry. The fact that tension among
relatives and throughout the community might result from such marriages was
dismissed by the court with the observation that the California statute would
perpetuate the very prejudices causing the tensions between races in the first
instance.
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marriages, and there was evidence that tension among relatives
and throughout the community would result, a legislative finding
that such alliances should be prohibited could not be declared
arbitrary. They declared that only the wisdom of the policy of
prohibiting such marriages was involved, and that with this wis-
dom the courts were not concerned. They concluded that the
statutes of California were constitutional, and that arguments for
change should be addressed to the legislature.
The Power of a State to Prohibit Marriage
on the Basis of Race Alone
In Maynard v. Hill, the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the
control of the legislature."22 In Meyer v. Nebraska, however, the
same body, in discussing the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, said that this included the "right of the individual
... to marry, establish a home and bring up children ... ." 23
In the light of these pronouncements, it is apparent that the
problem presented by miscegenation statutes is essentially that of
determining where, under the Constitution, the liberty of the indi-
vidual ends and the power of the state begins.
In Lochner v. New York, 4 the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a New York statute which limited the hours of work
in bakeries and confectionery establishments. The court declared
that there was no adequate justification for this infringement of
the private rights of the employer. But Mr. Justice Holmes in a
dissenting opinion declared:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the
natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law. 25
This dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes was later adopted
by the Supreme Court in cases involving statutes similar to that
in the Lochner case. 8 While these cases involved the liberty of
contract phase of the due process clause, the same line of reasoning
would seem applicable when the liberty to marry is concerned.
22125 U.S. 190, 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 726 (1888).
23262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 626 (1923).
24198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
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This would mean that when the dominant opinion in a state is
expressed in a statute prohibiting interracial marriages, and there
is conflict among the authorities as to the effect of such alliances
on the offspring and on the community, then the statute should be
held not to violate the due process clause in this respect.
But legislation which classifies individuals into separate groups
on the basis of race alone is by its very nature odious to a free
society whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality.27 In the absence of an emergency, such legislation in-
fringing the liberty of individuals should be declared unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 It will not do to declare that
statutes prohibiting interracial marriages do not deny equal treat-
ment since they apply with equal force to white persons as well
as to the members of the other races specified. The fact remains
that such statutes are based solely on race and are predicated on
the superiority of the white race. There is no scientific proof that
one race is superior, mentally or physically to another,29 or that
inferior progeny would result from interracial alliances." The
only real argument for prohibiting such marriages rests upon the
notion that tension among relatives and throughout the commu-
nity would result unless they were prohibited. But the elimination
of this tension cannot be achieved by legislation perpetuating the
discrimination which is the very source of the tension. A law which
would have that effect is contrary to our principles of equality and
a state should therefore be denied the power to prohibit marriage
on the basis of race alone in the absence of an emergency.
Since no clear and present danger was sought to be averted
by the California miscegenation statute in the Perez case, the Cali-
fornia Court arrived at a sound conclusion in declaring the statute
unconstitutional.
ROBERT KOVACH
251d. at 321, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 at 547.
26Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908) (upholding the
Oregon ten-hour law for women); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 Sup.
Ct. 435 (1917) (sustaining the Oregon ten-hour law applicable to industrial
employees generally.)
27Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1942) (legis-
lation discriminating against the Japanese upheld, but only because of the
emergency of World War II).
2Slbid.
291 MYRDAL, A,4 AMERICAN DILEMMA 83, c. iv-vi (1944). See also authorities
cited by the majority in the Perez case.
30Ibid.
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